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Abstract
An economy with two dates is considered, one state at the ¯rst date and a
¯nite number of states at the last date. Shareholders determine production
plans by voting { one share, one vote { and at ½-majority stable equilibria,
alternative production plans are supported by at most ½£ 100 percent of the
shareholders. It is shown that a ½-majority stable equilibrium exists provided
that
½ ¸ min
½ S ¡ J
S ¡ J + 1 ;
B
B + 1
¾
where S is the number of states at the last date, J is the number of ¯rms
and B is the dimensions of the sets of e±cient production plans for ¯rms.
Moreover, an example shows that ½-majority stable equilibria need not exist
for smaller ½'s.
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1 Introduction
If markets are complete then consumers have common shadow prices { name-
ly the vector of market prices. So shareholders agree that ¯rms should max-
imize pro¯ts with respect to these common prices. However, if markets are
incomplete, shadow prices need not be common. Thus, typically shareholders
disagree on the production plans to be chosen. Therefore several suggestions
have been put forward as reasonable objectives for ¯rms.
It seems natural that production plans should satisfy the Pareto criterion:
there are no alternative production plans that make some shareholders better
o® and none worse o®. Unfortunately, the Pareto criterion is weak: produc-
tion plans satisfy the Pareto criterion if and only if they maximize pro¯ts
with respect to some price vector in the convex hull of the shareholders'
shadow prices.
Drµeze (1974) and Grossman & Hart (1979) agree that production plans
should satisfy the Pareto criterion and propose that sidepayments between
shareholders be allowed. Drµeze (1974) (resp. Grossman & Hart (1979)) sug-
gests that production plans should re°ect preferences of ¯nal (resp. initial)
shareholders: this may be interpreted as production plans are determined
after markets close (resp. before markets open). However, sidepayments
depend on information that shareholders have incentives to manipulate, a
weakness that voting rules overcome.
Drµeze (1985) suggests that production plans should be stable for simple
majority voting between shareholders and unanimity between board members
(without sidepayments): there is no alternative production plan that makes
all board members as well as a majority of shareholders better o®. As in Drµeze
(1974) production plans re°ect preferences of ¯nal shareholders. It appears
to be a drawback that unanimity between board members is essential for
existence of equilibria.
DeMarzo (1993) investigates some properties of equilibria where produc-
tion plans are stable for simple majority voting between shareholders. Typi-
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cally the largest shareholder determines the production plan at these equilib-
ria. Also, DeMarzo shows that stability for simple majority voting between
shareholders and unanimity between board members imply that board mem-
bers determine the production plan. However, as he argues, such equilibria
need not exist unless either the degree of market incompleteness or the di-
mension of the set of e±cient production plans is 1.
In the present paper, stability with respect to ½-majority voting between
shareholders is studied: there is no alternative production plan that makes
more than ½ £ 100 percent of the shareholders better o®. Indeed, at a ½-
majority stable equilibrium (or ½-MSE), consumers do not want to change
their portfolios, ¯rms are not able to make more than ½£100 percent of their
shareholders better o® by changing production plans and ¯nally, markets
clear. It is shown that if portfolios are unbounded then a ½-MSE exists
provided that
½ ¸ min
½ S ¡ J
S ¡ J + 1 ;
B
B + 1
¾
where S is the number of states at the last date, J is the number of ¯rms
and B is the dimension of the set of e±cient production plans for ¯rms. If
portfolios are bounded to be non-negative then a ½-MSE exists provided that
½ ¸ B=(B + 1).
Di®erent timings of trade and vote are considered. Voting may take place
while markets are open or after markets close, in which case ¯nal sharehold-
ers vote (as in Drµeze (1985) and DeMarzo (1993)). And it may take place
before markets open, in which case initial shareholders vote. In case of vot-
ing before markets open or while they are open, shareholders need to form
expectations about price variations. Two types of price perceptions are con-
sidered: competitive price perceptions (as introduced by Grossman & Hart
(1979)) and ¯xed price perceptions. According to competitive price percep-
tions consumers perceive that income vectors are valued by their shadow
prices; whereas according to ¯xed price perceptions they perceive that prices
are not in°uenced by changes in production plans.
3
In general, changes of production plans in°uence trading opportunities
through two channels: they change the value of portfolios as well as the span
of assets. From this perspective, competitive price perceptions and ¯xed price
perceptions represent two extremes: consumers concentrate on how changes
of production plans change the value of their portfolios with the former and
the span of assets with the latter.
In case markets are complete, a ½-MSE exists even for unanimity, i.e.
with ½ = 0. Ekern & Wilson (1974) have shown that this result extends to
the case of partial spanning, i.e. the sets of e±cient production plans are
subsets of the span of assets1. In case markets are incomplete such that
either the degree of incompleteness is 1 or the sets of e±cient production
plans are 1-dimensional, a ½-MSE exists for simple majority voting, i.e. with
½ = 1=2, as argued by DeMarzo (1993). It is shown here that in case of
a more severe degree of incompleteness and higher dimensions of the sets
of e±cient production plans, super majority rules (½ > 1=2) are needed to
ensure existence of ½-MSE.
The social choice literature o®ers some general results on existence of
stable equilibria under super majority voting { see, e.g., Ferejohn & Grether
(1974), Greenberg (1979), Caplin & Nalebu® (1988, 1991) and Balasko &
Crµes (1997). Crµes (2000) exploits the results of Caplin & Nalebu® (1988,
1991) to obtain some conditions on the distribution of consumers' charac-
teristics under which a ½-MSE exists for ½ between 0.5 and 0.64 in a model
with a continuum of consumers, restrictive assumptions on production sets
and preferences of consumers. Here the result of Greenberg (1979) is ex-
ploited to obtain a lower bound on the rate ½ for which a ½-MSE exists, in a
model with a ¯nite number of consumers, weak assumptions on productions
sets and preferences, and no assumptions on the distribution of consumers'
characteristics. A di±culty in applying the results from the social choice
1See Magill & Quinzii (1996), chapter 6. Actually, existence of ½-MSE for ½ = 0 holds
in any model with incomplete markets where equilibrium allocations are Pareto optimal,
e.g., under strong conditions for the CAPM (Borch (1968) and Wilson (1968)).
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literature is that preferences of shareholders, as well as shares (i.e. voting
weights), are endogeneously determined through general equilibrium e®ects.
Even though the proposed bounds on ½ are quite high and cannot be
improved, as shown by an example, the results of the present paper show
that: (1) the degree of market incompleteness plays a fundamental role in re-
stricting the dimension of the set of alternatives and thereby in aggregating
preferences of shareholders and (2) the lower the degree of market incom-
pleteness the lower super majority rate is necessary to ensure existence of a
½-MSE.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 the model is introduced;
in Section 3 assumptions are stated, existence of a ½-MSE, for ½ ¸ minf(S¡
J)=(S ¡ J + 1); B=(B + 1)g, is established in case voting takes place after
markets close, and an example is given showing that the latter bound cannot
be improved; in Section 4 price perceptions are introduced and existence of a
½-MSE is established in case voting takes place either before markets open or
while they are open, and; ¯nally Section 5 contains some concluding remarks.
All proofs are gathered in an appendix.
2 The model
Consider an economy with 2 dates, t 2 f0; 1g, 1 state at the ¯rst date,
s = 0, and S states at the second date, s 2 f1; : : : ; Sg. There are: 1
commodity at every state, I consumers, i 2 f1; : : : ; Ig, and J ¯rms, j 2
f1; : : : ; Jg. Consumers are characterized by their consumption sets, Xi ½
RS+1, endowments, !i 2 RS+1, preferences described by correspondences,
Pi : Xi ! Xi, and initial portfolio of shares in ¯rms, ±i 2 RJ where PIi=1 ±ij =
1 for all j. Firms are characterized by their production sets, Yj ½ RS+1.
Consumers choose consumption plans, xi 2 Xi, and portfolios, µi 2 RJ .
Firms choose production plans, yj 2 Yj . For convenience, let x = (xi)Ii=1,
µ = (µi)Ii=1, y = (yj)Jj=1, q = (qj)Jj=1 2 RJ where qj is the price of shares in
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¯rm j, Y = (y1 ¢ ¢ ¢ yJ) and
Q =
0BBBBBB@
q1 ¢ ¢ ¢ qJ
0 ¢ ¢ ¢ 0
...
...
0 ¢ ¢ ¢ 0
1CCCCCCA :
With some abuse of notation, qj denotes the price of shares in ¯rm j as well
as the j'th column of Q. The budget set of consumer i is
Bi(Q; Y ) = fxi 2 Xijxi · !i +Q±i + (Y ¡Q)µi for some µi 2 RJg
and xi is a solution to the problem of consumer i provided that xi 2 Bi(Q; Y )
and Pi(xi) \ Bi(Q; Y ) = ;. Hence, there are no strategic considerations
involved in the choices of portfolios. Let Uij(xi; µij ; yj) denote the set of
production plans for ¯rm j that make, at the considered allocation (x; µ; y),
consumer i better o®, i.e.
Uij(xi; µij; yj) = fy0j 2 Yjjxi + (y0j ¡ yj)µij 2 Pi(xi)g:
Next let uj(x; µj; yj ; y0j) denote the set of consumers who are, at the considered
allocation (x; µ; y), better o® with production plan y0j for ¯rm j rather than
yj, i.e.
uj(x; µj; yj ; y0j) = fi 2 f1; : : : ; Igjy0j 2 Uij(xi; µij; yj)g:
Then preferences of ¯rms are described, for a ¯xed rate ½ of the super ma-
jority rule, by correspondences, P ½j :
Q
iXi £RI £ Yj ! Yj, de¯ned by
P ½j (x; µj ; yj) =
8>>>>><>>>>>>:
; for X
i
µ+ij = 0
fy0j 2 Yjj
P
i2uj(x;µj ;yj ;y0j) µ
+
ijP
i µ+ij
> ½g for X
i
µ+ij > 0:
And yj is a solution to the problem of ¯rm j provided that P ½j (x; µj ; yj)\Yj =
;. Thus, if the production plan is changed from yj to y0j then this change is
distributed to shareholders propotionally to their shares.
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De¯nition 1 (q¤; x¤; µ¤; y¤) is a ½-majority stable equilibrium provided
that
² x¤i · !i + Q¤±i + (Y ¤ ¡ Q¤)µ¤i and x¤i is a solution to the problem of
consumer i for (q¤; y¤), i.e.
x¤i 2 Bi(Q¤; Y ¤) and Pi(x¤i ) \Bi(Q¤; Y ¤) = ;
for all i 2 I,
² y¤j is a solution to the problem of ¯rm j for (x¤; µ¤j ), i.e.
y¤j 2 Y ¤j and P ½j (x¤; µ¤j ; y¤j ) \ Y ¤j = ;
for all j 2 J, and,
² markets clear, i.e.X
i
x¤i =
X
i
!¤i +
X
j
y¤j and
X
i
µ¤ij = 1
for all j 2 J.
3 Assumptions and existence of equilibrium
Assumptions on consumers, ¯rms and the production sector are imposed in
order to ensure the existence of a ½-majority stable equilibrium.
Consumers are supposed to satisfy the following assumptions
(a.1) Xi = RS+1,
(a.2) !i 2 RS+1,
(a.3) gr Pi is open,
(a.4) fxig +RS+1+ n f0g 2 Pi(xi),
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(a.5) for all xi, there exists a unique ¹i 2 ¢+ such that ¹i ¢ (x0i ¡ xi) > 0 for
all x0i 2 Pi(xi) where ¢S+ = f¸ 2 RS+1+ j Ps ¸s = 1g, and,
(a.6) if A ½ RS+1 is compact then there exists xi(A) 2 RS+1 such that if
xi 2 RS+1 n (fxi(A)g +RS+1+ ) then A ½ Pi(xi).
Assumptions (a.1) and (a.2) imply that consumption sets are unbounded as
considered by Balasko (1988) while assumptions (a.3), (a.4), (a.5) and (a.6)
are generalizations of equivalent assumptions considered by Balasko (1988)
to non-transitive, non-complete and non-di®erentiable preferences. Assump-
tions (a.3) and (a.4) are standard continuity and monotonicity assumptions;
assumption (a.5) states existence of a unique shadow price vector ¹i(xi) at
each consumption bundle xi, and; assumption (a.6) generalizes the standard
\boundedness from below" property of indi®erence sets to the present frame-
work where preferences are not necessarily transitive nor complete.
Let Zj ½ RS+1 be the set of e±cient production plans, i.e.
Zj = fyj 2 RS+1j(fyjg +RS+1+ ) \ Yj = fyjgg
then ¯rms are supposed to satisfy the following assumptions
(a.7) the production set, Yj, is convex and closed, and,
(a.8) there exists a compact and B-dimensional a±ne set, Bj ½ RS+1, such
that Zj ½ Bj .
Assumption (a.7) is standard while assumption (a.8) includes \truncated"
production sets such as
fy 2 RS+1jy0 2 [y; 0] and ys · (y0)b for all s 2 f1; : : : ; Sgg
where y · 0 and b 2]0; 1].
Moreover, the production sector of the economy is supposed to satisfy the
following assumption
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(a.9) production plans for date 1, ((ysj)Ss=1)Jj=1, are linearly independent for
all production plans in the convex hull of the closure of the set of
e±cient production plans, yj 2 co cl Zj for all j.
Assumption (a.9) excludes that ¯rms are able to replicate production plans
of each other.
Theorem 1 There exists a ½-majority stable equilibrium for all economies
which satisfy assumptions (a.1) to (a.9) if and and only if
½ ¸ min
½ S ¡ J
S ¡ J + 1 ;
B
B + 1
¾
:
Remark: The argument to establish the \if" of the assertion is based on
the proofs of Theorem 2 in Greenberg (1979) and the theorem in Shafer &
Sonnenschein (1975). A generalized game is constructed where, among other
constructions, ¯rms determine production plans that maximize pro¯ts with
respect to prices which re°ect interests of their shareholders and groups of
shareholders (one per ¯rm) determine prices for which ¯rms maximize pro¯ts.
Hence, the original problem of the ¯rm { which is to ¯nd a production plan
for which no alternative production plan can be supported by a ½-majority
of its shareholders { is decomposed into pro¯t maximization with respect to
¯rm speci¯c prices and determination of ¯rm speci¯c prices with respect to
some arti¯cial preferences for its shareholders.
The argument to establish the \only if" of the assertion is based on the
construction of an economy for which no ½-majority stable equilibrium with
½ < minf(S ¡ J)=(S ¡ J + 1); B=(B + 1)g exists.
End of remark
In case S¡J = 1, Theorem 1 ensures existence of a simple majority stable
equilibrium. It is easily seen that the prices for which ¯rms maximize pro¯ts
are, in this case, typically not the ones Drµeze (1974) suggests. Indeed, in
theorem 1 the shadow price vector of the median shareholder is used whereas
Drµeze (1974) suggests that the average shadow price vector should be used.
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Trading on the ¯nancial markets, when consumers are not constrained
in their portfolio choices, leads to suitable normalized shadow prices being
contained in some (S¡J)-dimensional a±ne set (hY ¤¡Q¤i?\¢S+). However,
if there are restrictions on portfolios, like short sales constraints, then the
degree of market incompleteness need not restrict shadow prices.
Corollary 1 Suppose that portfolios are bounded such that µi 2 [0; 1]J for
all i and that co cl Zj ½ RS+1+ for all j. Then there exists a ½-majority stable
equilibrium provided that
½ ¸ B
B + 1
:
It is hard to love the assumption that co cl Zj ½ RS+1+ for all j. However,
the \Cass-trick" { one consumer trades on complete markets { cannot be
applied in corollary 1 because portfolios are bounded to be between 0 and
1. Therefore existence of equilibrium is only ensured provided that prices
of shares are positive as explained by Radner (1972) and the assumption
ensures this.
4 Price perceptions
In the present section di®erent timings between trade and vote are considered.
At a ½-majority stable equilibrium, (q¤; x¤; µ¤; y¤), if consumer i considers how
to vote with regard to a change from (q¤j ; y¤j ) to (qj ; yj) of price and production
plan for ¯rm j (where ±ij > 0 or µ¤ij > 0 because otherwise consumer i have
no voting weight) then
² in case voting takes place after markets close, she votes for the change
if and only if
x¤i + (Y
¤jyj ¡ Y ¤)µ¤i 2 Pi(x¤i )
where Y ¤jyj is Y ¤ with yj replacing y¤j ,
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² in case voting takes place while markets are open, she votes for the
change if and only if
x¤i ¡ (Y ¤ ¡Q¤jqj)µ¤i + (Y ¤jyj ¡Q¤jqj)µi 2 Pi(x¤i )
for some µi, and,
² in case voting takes place before markets open, she votes for the change
if and only if
x¤i ¡ (Q¤ ¡Q¤jqj)±i ¡ (Y ¤ ¡Q¤)µ¤i + (Y ¤jyj ¡Q¤jqj)µi 2 Pi(x¤i )
for some µi (here the voting weights are ±+j ).
If portfolios are unbounded, i.e. µi 2 RJ , then ¹i(x¤i ) 2 hY ¤ ¡ Q¤i? at a
½-majority stable equilibrium, (q¤; x¤; µ¤; y¤). Therefore in case voting takes
place after markets close (resp. while markets are open or before they open),
if consumer i votes for the change then ¹i(x¤i ) ¢ (yj ¡ y¤j ) > 0 (resp. ¹i(x¤i ) ¢
(qj¡q¤j ) > 0 or ¹i(x¤i ) ¢(yj¡qj) 6= 0). Thus, equivalently, in case voting takes
place after markets close (resp. while markets are open or before they open),
if ¹i(x¤i ) ¢ (yj¡ y¤j ) · 0 (resp. ¹i(x¤i ) ¢ (Q¡Q¤) · 0 and ¹i(x¤i ) ¢ (yj¡ qj) = 0)
then consumer i votes against the change. However, consumers do not know
how prices depend on production plans so if voting takes place before or
while markets are open then they need to form perceptions about this.
4.1 Competitive price perceptions
Grossman & Hart (1979) introduced the notion of competitive price percep-
tions in a model where production plans are determined by shareholders be-
fore markets open. Consider a ½-majority stable equilibrium, (q¤; x¤; µ¤; y¤),
then a change of production plan from y¤j to yj for ¯rm j is perceived by
consumer i to change the price from q¤j to
qij(x¤i ; yj) =
1
¹0i (x¤i )
¹i(x¤i ) ¢ yj :
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Consequently, if consumer i votes for the change and has competitive price
perception then ¹i(x¤i ) ¢ (yj ¡ y¤j ) > 0 and, equivalently, if ¹i(x¤i ) ¢ (yj ¡
y¤j ) · 0 then consumer i votes against the change. This does not depend on
whether voting takes place before markets open, while they are open or after
they close. Informally, if consumers have competitive price perceptions then
they concentrate on how changes of production plans change values of their
portfolios rather than the span of assets.
Thus, there is a di®erent interpretation of the model of Section 2 as well
as the results of Section 3: voting takes place while markets are open and
consumers have competitive price perceptions. Moreover, Theorem 1 and
Corollary 1 extend to the model with voting before markets open provided
that consumers have competitive price perceptions. However in this latter
case the set of equilibria is typically not identical to the set of equilibria of the
former case because voting weights typically are not identical, i.e. µ¤i 6= ±i.
Hence, the next corollary follows from the proof of Theorem 1 with only
minor modi¯cations.
Corollary 2 Suppose that voting takes place before markets open, while they
are open or after they close and that consumers have competitive price per-
ceptions. Then there exists a ½-majority stable equilibrium provided that
½ ¸ min
½ S ¡ J
S ¡ J + 1 ;
B
B + 1
¾
:
4.2 Fixed price perceptions
Consider a ½-majority stable equilibrium, (q¤; x¤; µ¤; y¤), then a change of
production plan from y¤j to yj for ¯rm j is perceived by consumer i not to
change the price, q¤j . Informally, if consumers have ¯xed price perceptions
then they concentrate on how changes of production plans change the span
of assets rather than values of portfolios.
Portfolios are bounded between 0 and 1, i.e. µi 2 [0; 1]J , so the modi¯ed
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budget set of consumer i is
~Bi(Q;Y ) = fxi 2 Xijxi · !i +Q±i + (Y ¡Q)µi for some µi 2 [0; 1]Jg:
Let
~Uij(q; xi; y) = fy0j 2 Yjjxi + (Y jy0j ¡Q)µi 2 Pi(xi)
for some µi 2 [0; 1]Jg
~uj(q; x; y; y0j) = fi 2 f1; : : : ; Igjy0j 2 ~Uij(q; xi; yj)g
then preferences of ¯rms are described by correspondences, ~P ½j : RJ£QiXi£
[0; 1]I £ Qj Yj ! Yj , de¯ned by
~P ½j (q; x; µj; y) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
; for X
i
µ+ij = 0
fy0j 2 Yjj
P
i2~uj(x;µj ;y;y0j) µ
+
ijP
i µ+ij
> ½g for X
i
µ+ij > 0
in case voting takes place while markets are open and ±j replaces µj in case
voting takes place before markets open.
Corollary 3 Suppose that portfolios are bounded such that µi 2 [0; 1]J for
all i, that co cl Zj ½ RS+1+ for all j and that consumers have ¯xed price
perceptions. Then a ½-majority stable equilibrium exists provided that
½ ¸ B
B + 1
:
5 Final remarks
In the present paper, bounds on ½ are provided such that ½-majority stable
equilibria exist. To complement these results on existence of equilibrium it
would be nice study: (1) the e±ciency properties of equilibrium allocations,
and; (2) the \size" of the set of equilibria.
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On the one hand, in many countries, simple majority voting is used in
assemblies of shareholders. On the other hand, the provided bounds on ½
implies that simple majority stable equilibria need not exist unless either
the degree of incompleteness is 1 or the sets of e±cient production plans
are 1-dimensional. Therefore it would be interesting to ¯nd \reasonable"
assumptions on production sets and preferences of consumers that ensure
existence of ½-majority stable equilibria for lower values of ½.
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Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1
In part 1, resp. part 2, it is shown that if ½ ¸ (S ¡ J)=(S ¡ J + 1), resp.
½ ¸ B=(B + 1), then a ½-majority stable equilibrium exists. In part 3, an
example is provided of an economy for which no ½-majority stable equilibrium
with ½ < minf(S ¡ J)=(S ¡ J + 1); B=(B + 1)g exists.
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Part 1: ½ ¸ (S ¡ J)=(S ¡ J + 1)
The variables to be determined are state prices, ¸ 2 ¢S+, consumption bun-
dles for consumers, x = (xi)Ii=1 ½ QIi=1Xi, production plans for ¯rms,
y = (yj)Jj=1 ½ QJj=1 Yj , and prices with respect to which ¯rms maximize
pro¯ts, º = (ºj)Jj=1 2 QJj=1 ¢S+.
The auctioneer (agent 0) determines state prices in order to maximize
the value of excess demand. Consumers (agent k 2 f1; : : : ; Ig) determine
maximal consumption bundles for their preferences. Firms (agent k 2 fI +
1; : : : ; I+Jg) determine production plans that maximize pro¯ts with respect
to prices which re°ect interests of their shareholders. Groups of shareholders
(agent k 2 fI + J + 1; : : : ; I + 2Jg, one group per ¯rm) determine prices
for which ¯rms maximize pro¯ts. Hence, the original problem of the ¯rm {
which is to ¯nd a production plan for which no alternative production can
be supported by a ½-majority of its shareholders { is decomposed into pro¯t
maximization with respect to ¯rm speci¯c prices and determination of ¯rm
speci¯c prices with respect to some arti¯cial preferences for its shareholders.
In a ¯rst step, these four categories of agents (auctioneer, consumers,
¯rms and groups of shareholders) are described. In a second step, a suitable
correspondence is constructed and Kakutani's ¯xed point theorem is applied.
Finally, in a third step, the ¯xed point is shown to be a ½-majority stable
equilibrium.
Step 1: description of agents
\Auctioneer" For agent k = 0, the strategy set, Vk ½ RS+1, is de¯ned by
Vk = ¢S+ \ [ 1n; 1]
S+1
where n 2 N, the constraint correspondence, Ck : V ! Vk (where V is the
product of the agents' strategy sets, to be de¯ned in the sequel), is de¯ned
by
Ck(¸; x; y; º) = Vk
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and the preference correspondence, Qk : V ! Vk, is de¯ned by
Qk(¸; x; y; º) = f¸0 2 Vkj(¸0 ¡ ¸) ¢ (
X
i
xi ¡
X
i
!i ¡
X
j
yj) > 0g:
Clearly, Vk is compact and convex, Ck is continuous and gr Qk is open with
¸ =2 co Qk(¸; x; y; º).
\Consumers" For agent k 2 f1; : : : ; Ig, the strategy set, Vk ½ Xi where
i = k, is de¯ned by
Vk = Xi \ (f!ig + X
j
±ijco cl Zj + [¡n; n]S+1)
where n 2 N, the constraint correspondence, Ck : V ! Vk, is de¯ned by
Ck(¸; x; y; º) = fx0i 2 Vkj¸ ¢ (x0i ¡ !i ¡Q±i) · 0g
for k = 1 where qj = (1=¸0)¸ ¢ yj for all j and
Ck(¸; x; y; º) = Bi(Y;Q) \ Vk
for k 2 f2; : : : ; Ig and the preference correspondence, Qk : V ! Vk, is de¯ned
by
Qk(¸; x; y; º) = co Pi(xi) \ Vk:
Clearly, Vk is compact and convex, Ck is continuous and gr Qk is open with
xi =2 co Qk(¸; x; y; º) for i = k.
\Firms" For agent k 2 fI + 1; : : : ; I + Jg, the strategy set, Vk ½ Yj , is
de¯ned by
Vk = co cl Zj
where j = k ¡ I, the constraint correspondence, Ck : V ! Vk, de¯ned by
Ck(¸; x; y; º) = Vk
and the preference correspondence, Qk : V ! Vk, de¯ned by
Qk(¸; x; y; º) = fy0j 2 Zjjºj ¢ (y0j ¡ yj) > 0g \ Vk:
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Clearly, Vk is compact and convex, Ck is continuous and gr Qk is open with
yj =2 co Qk(¸; x; y; º) for j = k ¡ I.
\Shareholders" For agent k 2 fI + J + 1; : : : ; I + 2Jg, the strategy set,
Vk ½ RS+1, is de¯ned by
Vk = ¢S+;
the constraint correspondence, Ck : V ! Vk, is de¯ned by
Ck(¸; x; y; º) = fº0j 2 Vkjº 0j 2 hY ¡Qi?g
where j = k ¡ I ¡ J . Let the correspondence Fi : Vi £ Vk ! Vk where
i 2 f1; : : : ; Ig be de¯ned by
Fi(xi; ºj) = fº 0j 2 Vkj kº 0j ¡ ¹i(xi)k < kºj ¡ ¹i(xi)kg
where j = k ¡ I ¡ J and let the correspondence Gj : QIi=1 Vi £ Vk £ Vk !
f1; : : : ; Ig be de¯ned by
Gj(x; ºj ; º 0j) = fi 2 f1; : : : ; Igjº0j 2 Fi(xi; ºj)g:
Then the preference correspondence, Qk : V ! Vk, is de¯ned by
Qk(¸; x; y; º) =
8>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>:
; for X
i
´ij(¸; x; y)+ = 0
fº0k 2 Vkj
P
i2Gj(ºk;¹;º0k) ´ij(¸; x; y)
+P
i ´ij(¸; x; y)+
> ½g
for
X
i
´ij(¸; x; y)+ > 0
where j = k ¡ I ¡ J and ´i : V0 £ QIi=1 Vi £ QJj=1 Zj ! RJ is de¯ned by
´i(¸; x; y) = argmin kxi ¡ !i ¡Q±i ¡ (Y ¡Q)´ik; s.t. ´i 2 RJ :
Clearly, Vk is compact and convex and Ck is continuous. Lemma 1 below
shows that gr Qk is open and that ºj =2 co (Qk(¸; x; y; º) \Ck(¸; x; y; º)) for
j = k ¡ I ¡ J .
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Lemma 1 The preference correspondence for shareholders, Qk : V ! Vk
where k 2 fI + J + 1; : : : ; I + 2Jg, has the following properties
² gr Qk is open, and,
² ºj =2 co (Qk(¸; x; y; º) \ Ck(¸; x; y; º)) for k = I + J + j.
Proof: \gr Qk is open" Suppose that (xi(n))t2N 2 Vi converges to xi 2 Vi
and that (¹i(xi(n)))t2N 2 ¢S+ converges to ¹i 6= ¹i(xi) 2 ¢S+. Then there
exists x0i 2 Pi(xi) such that ¹i ¢ (x0i ¡ xi) · 0 so there exists x00i 2 Pi(xi) such
that ¹i ¢ (x00i ¡xi) < 0. Therefore there exists N 2 N such that if n ¸ N then
ºi(xi(n)) ¢ (x00i ¡ xi(n)) < 0 and x00i 2 Pi(xi(n)) according to (a.3). This is a
contradiction thus ¹i : Vi ! ¢S+ is continuous. Clearly, if ¹i : Vi ! ¢S+ is
continuous for all i then gr Qk is open due to the de¯nition of Qk : V ! Vk.
\ºj =2 co (Qk(¸; x; y; º) \Ck(¸; x; y; º)) for k = I + J + j" Let [r] 2 Z be
de¯ned by [r] · r < [r] + 1 for all r 2 R and let Lm = Pi[´ij(¸; x; y)+m] ·
m
P
i ´ij(¸; x; y)+ arti¯cial consumers be de¯ned by
Tl = Ui(ºj; xi)
for all l 2 fPi0<i[´i0j(¸; x; y)m] + 1; : : : ;Pi0·i[´i0j(¸; x; y)m]g and m 2 N
provided that m´ij(¸; x; y) ¸ 1. Let tj : ¢S+ ! f1; : : : ; Lmg be de¯ned by
tj(º0j) = fl 2 f1; : : : ; Lmgj´ij(¸; x; y)+ > 0 and º0j 2 Tlg
and let Rj ½ ¢S+ be de¯ned by
Rj = fº0j 2 ¢S+jjtj(º 0j)j > ½
X
i
´ij(¸; x; y)+mg:
If º 0j 2 Qk(¸; x; y; º) then there exists " > 0 such that
" =
P
i2Gj(ºj ;x;º0j) ´ij(¸; x; y)
+P
i ´ij(¸; x; y)+
¡ ½
due to the de¯nition of Qk : V ! Vk. Therefore, º 0j 2 Rj provided that
m > I=("
P
i ´(¸; x; y)+) so Qk(¸; x; y; º) ½ [mRj .
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Clearly, ºj =2 co (Fi(ºj; xi) \ Ck(¸; x; y; º)) due to the construction of
Fi : ¢S+ £ Vi ! ¢S+ therefore ºj =2 co (Rj \ Ck(¸; x; y; º)) for all m be-
cause dimCk(¸; x; y; º) = S ¡ J and ½ ¸ (S ¡ J)=(S ¡ J + 1) hence
ºj =2 co (Qk(¸; x; y; º) \ Ck(¸; x; y; º)) according to Greenberg (1979).
Q.E.D.
Step 2: construction of correspondence and existence of ¯xed point
Let K = f0; : : : ; I + 2Jg then Vk is compact and convex for all k 2 K and
V =
Q
k2K Vk. Let the map fk : V £ Vk ! R+ be de¯ned by
fk(z; z0k) = min(v;v0k)2(gr Qk)c
k(z; z0k) ¡ (v; v0k)k;
the correspondence gk : V ! Vk by
gk(z) = arg max
z0k2Ck(z)
fk(z; z0k):
Then the correspondence, h : V ! V de¯ned by hk(z) = co gk(z) is upper
hemi-continuous and compact and convex valued. Therefore there exists
(¸¤; x¤1; : : : ; x¤I ; y¤1; : : : ; y¤J ; º¤) = z¤ 2 Z such that z¤ 2 h(z¤) according to the
Kakutani ¯xed point theorem. Hence, z¤k 2 Ck(z¤) and Qk(z¤) \ Ck(z¤) = ;
because zk =2 co Qk(z) \ Ck(z).
Step 3: existence of ½-majority stable equilibrium
For consumers, there exists xi(f!ig + Pj ±ijco cl Zj) 2 RS+1 such that if
xi 2 Bi(Q;Y ) and Pi(xi) \Bi(Q; Y ) = ; then xi ¸ xi(f!ig + Pj ±ijco cl Zj)
according to (a.6) because f!ig+Pj ±ijco cl Zj is compact according to (a.7).
Therefore there exist z¤ 2 h(z¤) and NC 2 N such that if n ¸ NC - recall that
Vk = Xi\(f!ig+Pj ±ijco cl Zj+[¡n; n]S+1) for k = i - then x¤i 2 Bi(Q¤; Y ¤)
and co Pi(x¤i ) \Bi(Q¤; Y ¤) = ; thus x¤i = !i +Q¤±i + (Y ¤ ¡Q¤)µ¤i for some
µ¤i 2 [0; 1]J .
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For consumers, if ¸(n) ! ¸ where ¸s(n) ¸ 1=n and ¸s = 0 for s 2 S 0 ½
S and x1(n) 2 C1(¸(n); x(n); y(n); º(n)) and Q1(¸(n); x(n); y(n); º(n)) \
C1(¸(n); x(n); y(n); º(n)) = ; then Ps2S0 xs1(n) ! 1 according to (a.3) and
(a.4) while consumption is bounded from below for all consumers according
to (a.6). Therefore, for the auctioneer, there exists NA 2 N such that if
n ¸ NA - recall that Vk = ¢S+ \ [1=n; 1]S+1 for k = 0 - and z¤ 2 h(z¤) thenP
i x¤i =
P
i !i +
P
j y¤j .
For the ¯rms, if z¤ 2 h(z¤) then y¤j 2 argmax º¤j yj ; s.t. yj 2 co cl Zj
therefore y¤j 2 argmax º¤j yj; s.t. yj 2 Yj and Yj ½ fy¤jg + hº¤j i ¡RS+1+ .
Lemma 2 If z¤ 2 h(z¤) and n ¸ NC then P ½j (x¤; µ¤j ; y¤j ) = ;.
Proof: Suppose that n ¸ NC , if x¤i + (yj ¡ y¤j )µ¤ij 2 Pi(x¤i ) and µ¤ij > 0
then ¹i(x¤i ) ¢ (yj ¡ y¤j ) > 0 and if ¹i(x¤i ) ¢ (yj ¡ y¤j ) 6= 0 and µij > 0 then
x¤i + (yj ¡ y¤j ) =2 Pi(x¤i ). Hence, ifP
i2Hj(vj) µ
¤+
ijP
i µ¤+ij
· ½
for all vj 2 hº¤j i? where
Hj(vj) = fi 2 f1; : : : ; Igj¹i(x¤i ) ¢ vj > 0g
then P ½j (x¤; µ¤j ; y¤j ) = ; because Yj ½ fy¤jg + hº¤j i? ¡ RS+1+ . Thus, hvji?
separates Hj(vj) from the rest of the i's in the sense that Hj(vj) is above
hvji? while the rest of the i's are below or on hvji?, i.e. i 2 Hj(vj) if and
only if ¹i(x¤i ) ¢ vj > 0.
For vj 2 hº¤j i? suppose that Ps vsj < 1 without loss of generality and let
(p(n))n2N 2 ¢ where ¢ = f¸ 2 RS+1j Ps ¸s = 1g be de¯ned by
p(n) =
1
n+
P
s vsj
(nº¤j + vj):
for all n then (p(n))n2N converges to º¤j . Let (q(n))n2N 2 hp(n) + º¤j i? be
de¯ned by
q(n) = (p(n) ¡ º¤j ) ¡ (p(n) ¡ º
¤
j ) ¢ (p(n) + º¤j )
(p(n) + º¤j ) ¢ (p(n) + º¤j )(p(n) + º
¤
j ):
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for all n. Then some tedious calculations show that (nq(n))n2N converges
to vj and hq(n)i? separates Gj(º¤j ; x¤; p(n)) from the rest of the i's in the
sense that Gj(º¤j ; x¤; p(n)) is above hq(n)i? while the rest of the i's are below
or on hq(n)i?. Moreover there exists N 2 N such that if n ¸ N then
hvji? separates Gj(º¤j ; x¤; p(n)) from the rest of the i's in the sense that
Gj(º¤j ; x¤; p(n)) is above hvji? while the rest of the i's are below or on hvji?.
Thus if n ¸ N then Gj(º¤j ; x¤; p(n)) = Hj(vj). Therefore, P ½j (x¤; µ¤j ; y¤j ) = ;
because QI+J+j(z¤) = ;.
Q.E.D.
For shareholders, if z¤ 2 hI+J+j(z¤) then P ½j (x¤; µ¤j ; y¤j ) = ; provided that
n ¸ NC according to lemma 2. Thus, if ½ ¸ (S ¡ J)=(S ¡ J + 1) and
n ¸ maxfNA; NCg then a ½-majority stable equilibrium exists.
Part 2: ½ ¸ B=(B + 1)
The variables to be determined are state prices, ¸ 2 ¢S+, consumption bun-
dles for consumers, x = (xi)Ii=1 ½ QIi=1Xi, and production plans for ¯rms,
y = (yj)Jj=1 ½ QJj=1 Yj .
Let strategy sets, constraint correspondences and preference correspon-
dences be de¯ned as in part 1 of the proof for k 2 f0; 1; : : : ; Ig.
\Firms" For agent k 2 fI + 1; : : : ; I + Jg, the strategy set, Vk ½ RS+1,
is de¯ned by
Vk = co cl Zj
where j = k ¡ I, the constraint correspondence, Ck : V ! Vk, is de¯ned by
Ck(¸; x; y; ) = Vk
and the preference correspondence, Qk : V ! Vk, is de¯ned by
Qk(¸; x; y) = P
½
j (x; ´j(¸; x; y); yj) \ Vk:
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Clearly, Vk is compact and convex, Ck is continuous and gr Qk is open with
yj =2 co Qk(¸; x; y) for j = k ¡ I according to the proof of theorem 2 in
Greenberg (1979).
The rest of the proof follows from part 1. Thus, if ½ ¸ B=(B + 1) then a
½-majority stable equilibrium exists.
Part 3: an example showing that the bound is binding
Consider an economy with S consumers with utility functions linear in period
zero consumption and log-linear in period 1 consumption. Consumer i is
indexed by weights, ¼i = (¼si )Ss=1 with
PS
s=1 ¼si = 1, on consumption in
di®erent states. The utility function of consumer i is:
ui(xi) = x0i +
SX
s=1
¼si log x
s
i with
8<: ¼si = " if s 6= i¼ii = 1 ¡ (S ¡ 1)" (1)
where " 2]0; 1 ¡ 1=(S ¡ 1)[ is small. Although these utility functions do not
satisfy assumption (a.6), since the argument is local they can be easily ex-
tended outside the relevant domain to ful¯ll this assumption. All consumers
are endowed with identical initial shares of the J ¯rms: ±ij = 1=S, for all i; j,
and the same vector of initial resources: !i = (!; 0; : : : ; 0), all i.
All J ¯rms have their sets of e±cient production plans included in the
same (S ¡ 1)-dimensional linear subspace:
Y =
(
y = (y0; y1; y2; : : : ; yS) 2 RS j
SX
s=0
ys = 0 and y0 = ¡1
)
:
De¯ne the production plans y = (yj)Jj=1 by:
ysj =
8>><>>:
¡1 for s = 0
1 for s = j
0 otherwise
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for j · J ¡ 1 and for ¯rm J
ysJ =
8>><>>:
¡1 for s = 0
1=(S ¡ J + 1) for s 2 fJ; : : : ; Sg
0 otherwise
Next, de¯ne ~y = (~yj)Jj=1 such that ~yJ = yJ and ~yj = ®yj + (1 ¡ ®)yJ for
j · J ¡ 1, with ® = J=S. Let, for all j, Zj = Y \ B(~yj; º) where B(~yj ; º)
stands for the ball with center ~yj and radius º. This way, an ("; º)-economy
is de¯ned.
Observation 1 For all ´, there exists ("; º) such that the ("; º)-economy
does not have a ½-majority stable equilibrium for ½ < (S¡J)=(S¡J+1)¡´.
Consider the ("; 0)-economy. It is now shown that there is a unique ½-
majority stable equilibrium (for all ½ since º = 0 implies there is no al-
ternative production plan), (q¤; µ¤; y¤), with y¤ = ~y and q¤ = ¯1J where
¯ = S=J ¡ 1.
For the announced production plans y¤, the expression of the utility level
of agent i buying, at price q¤, the portfolio (µij)Jj=1 is:
! + ¯
J
S
¡ (¯ + 1)
JX
j=1
µij| {z }
x0i
+
J¡1X
s=1
¼si log [®µis]| {z }
xsi ;s·J¡1
+ ¼Vi log
"
µiJ + (1 ¡ ®)µiU
S ¡ J + 1
#
| {z }
xsi ;s¸J
;
where U = f1; : : : ; J ¡ 1g, V = fJ; : : : ; Sg, ¼Vi =
X
s2V
¼si and µiU =
X
j2U
µij .
First-order conditions of this maximization problem (optimal portfolio
choice) gives:
8s · J ¡ 1 : ¼
s
i
µis
+
(1 ¡ ®)¼Vi
µiJ + (1 ¡ ®)µiU = ¯ + 1; and
¼Vi
µiJ + (1 ¡ ®)µiU = ¯ + 1;
which in turn yields:
8s · J ¡ 1 : µis = ¼
s
i
®(¯ + 1)
; and µiJ =
¼Vi
¯ + 1
¡ 1 ¡ ®
®
¼Ui
¯ + 1
:
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It is easily checked that stock markets clear, as well as markets for good, for
the chosen values of ® = J=S and under the equilibrium price ¯ = S=J ¡ 1.
Then the equilibrium portfolio is:
8s · J ¡ 1 : µ¤is = ¼si ; and µ¤iJ = JS¼
V
i ¡ (1 ¡ JS )¼
U
i ;
which is such that
JX
j=1
µ¤ij =
J
S
for all i.
Suppose now that ¯rm J is given the opportunity to propose a small
change of its production plan. For " small enough, one has µ¤iJ > 0 for
J · i · S and µ¤iJ < 0 for 0 · i · J ¡ 1. Hence, only the S ¡ J + 1 last
consumers have a positive quantity of shares in ¯rm J and consequently they
are the only ones to vote, with the same voting weights. The utility function
of consumer i, J · i · S, has been constructed such that, at this symmetric
equilibrium, consumer i supports a (technically possible) change from yJ to
y0J in ZJ if and only if yiJ · y0iJ , i.e. any change that yields more in state
i. For example, y0J = yJ + (0; : : : ; 0;¡"; "=(S ¡ J); : : : ; "=(S ¡ J)) gets the
support of the last S¡J shareholders/shares. Hence, (q¤; µ¤; y¤) is not stable
for any super majority rule of size smaller than (S¡J)=(S¡J +1). Subject
to the obvious upper hemi-continuity of the equilibrium correspondence in
the present setup, any ½-majority stable equilibrium of the ("; º)-economy,
for " and º small enough, is such that ½ > (S ¡ J)=(S ¡ J + 1)¡ ´. Finally,
note that S ¡ J · B = S ¡ 1 so there is no need to consider the other case
which is more obvious.
Proof of Corollary 1
The variables to be determined are prices, p 2 ¢J+, consumption bundles
for consumers, x = (xi)Ii=1 ½ QIi=1Xi, and production plans for ¯rms, y =
(yj)Jj=1 ½ QJj=1 Yj.
\Auctioneer" For agent k = 0, the strategy set, Vk ½ RJ+1, is de¯ned by
Vk = ¢J+ \ [ 1n; 1]
J+1
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where n 2 N, the constraint correspondence, Ck : V ! Vk, is de¯ned by
Ck(p; x; y) = Vk
and the preference correspondence, Qk : V ! Vk, is de¯ned by
Qk(p; x; y) = fp0 2 Vkj(p00 ¡ p0)(
X
i
x0i ¡
X
i
!0i ¡
X
j
y0j )
+
X
j
(p0j ¡ pj)(
X
i
´ij(p; x; y) ¡ 1) > 0g:
where qj = pj=p0 for all j and ´i : V0 £ QIi=1 Vi £ QJj=1 Zj ! [0; 1]J is de¯ned
by
´i(p; x; y) = argmin kxi ¡ !i ¡Q±i ¡ (Y ¡Q)´ik; s.t. ´i 2 [0; 1]J
for all i. Clearly, Vk is compact and convex, Ck is continuous and gr Qk is
open with p =2 co Qk(p; x; y).
\Consumers" As in part 1 in the proof of theorem 1 - restricting portfolios
to [0; 1]J and disregarding º.
\Firms" As in part 2 in the proof of theorem 1 - restricting portfolios
to [0; 1]J in the de¯nition of P ½j (x; µj; yj), replacing µj with ´j(p; x; y) and
disregarding º.
The rest of the proof follows from the last part of part 1 in the proof
theorem 1.
Proof of Corollary 3
Proof: Follows from the proof of Theorem 1 with minor changes provided
that xi 2 ~Bi(Q; Y ) and Pi(xi) \ ~Bi(Q; Y ) imply that yj 6= co ~Uij(q; xi; yj).
Hence, suppose that (yj(n))Nn=1 2 ~Uij(q; xi; y) where N 2 N then there
exists (µi(n))Nn=1 such that xi + (Y jyj(n) ¡ Q)µi(n) 2 Pi(xi) for all n 2
f1; : : : ; ng. Suppose that y0j = Pn ®(n)yj(n) where ®(n) ¸ 0 for all n and
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P
n ®(n) = 1 and let µ0j and (¯(n))Nn=1 where ¯(n) ¸ 0 for all n and Pn ¯(n) =
1 be de¯ned by ®(n)µ0ij = ¯(n)µij(n) for all n and µ0ij0 =
P
n ¯(n)µij0(n) for
all j0 6= j. Then
xi + (Y jy0j ¡Q)µ0i =
NX
n=1
¯(n)(xi + (Y jyj(n) ¡Q)µi(n)):
Therefore, if xi 2 ~Bi(Q; Y ) and Pi(xi) \ ~Bi(Q; Y ) then yj =2 co ~Uij(q; xi; yj).
It is necessary to bound portfolios to be non-negative in order to ensure
that there exists µ0i and (¯(n))n such that (Y jy0j¡Q)µ0i = Pn ¯(n)(Y jyj(n)¡
Q)µi(n).
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